La estabilidad de la rentabilidad del crédito privado se está poniendo a prueba

Private-credit funds have attracted investors with high income and unusually stable reported returns. Yet the financial reports published by US business development companies (BDCs) for the first quarter of 2026 suggest that more borrowers are struggling to meet their obligations, even as lenders continue to recognise interest on loans that generate little immediate cash.

An analysis by Reuters of 51 publicly traded BDCs found unrealised losses equivalent to 2.35 percent of net asset value, the highest level since 2022. Identifiable payment-in-kind (PIK) income, which allows borrowers to add interest to their outstanding debt rather than pay it in cash, remained at approximately US$477m. A separate examination of 53 BDCs found an average quarterly loss of US$7.6m, against an average profit of US$26m a year earlier. Twenty-eight lenders reported losses, more than twice the number in the first quarter of 2025.

Private-credit managers have long argued that holding loans outside public markets allows them to avoid the volatility associated with regularly traded bonds. Investors receive periodic valuations based on the borrower’s financial position, comparable transactions and the manager’s assessment of likely repayment. Prices do not change every time bond markets react to economic news, although the companies responsible for servicing the debt face many of the same pressures as publicly traded borrowers.

That valuation process has come under closer scrutiny as the industry has grown. According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), global private-credit assets under management now exceed US$2.5tn, with pension funds, insurers and sovereign wealth funds supplying much of the institutional capital. Wealth managers have also introduced these strategies to private clients seeking income beyond conventional fixed-income investments. The resulting portfolios contain thousands of loans that rarely change hands, leaving investors dependent on valuations produced within the fund management industry.

In an earlier review of private-credit funds reporting to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, the BIS found that only 40 percent of the funds in its sample used third-party valuation providers. Managers generally have extensive information about their borrowers, including access to financial statements and discussions with management teams, but their estimates are difficult to verify without regular transactions in comparable loans. When a company’s cash flow deteriorates, lenders must judge whether the problem is temporary or whether the loan has permanently lost value.

When Interest Becomes More Debt

Borrowers facing tighter cash flow can negotiate amendments rather than immediately miss payments. A lender might extend the maturity of a loan, alter its covenants or permit the company to capitalise interest. Such arrangements can provide breathing space for businesses that need time to restore earnings, though they also leave creditors exposed to a larger repayment obligation.

Payment-in-kind interest is particularly revealing because funds can recognise income without collecting the corresponding cash. Under a conventional loan agreement, the borrower transfers interest to the lender on scheduled payment dates. A PIK provision instead adds that interest to the principal, increasing the amount due when the loan matures or is refinanced.

Some companies negotiate PIK financing from the outset, especially when they are investing heavily in expansion. Others adopt it after their finances have weakened. The latter cases deserve closer attention because the original expectation of regular cash payments has already proved difficult to meet.

Reuters identified roughly US$477m of PIK income among the BDCs it reviewed in the first quarter of 2026, down from a peak of US$633m in early 2025 but still elevated. A lender can continue recognising such interest while receiving less cash from the underlying portfolio. Funds that make regular distributions to investors must meet those payments from available cash, even when part of their reported income consists of interest that has yet to be collected. Fitch has warned that high PIK exposure can strain BDC liquidity when cash earnings fail to cover dividends.

How much interest a manager actually collects is consequently central to assessing the quality of a fund’s yield. The accounts alone cannot establish whether capitalised interest will eventually be paid, particularly when the borrower’s ability to refinance depends on earnings recovering.

Financial conditions among some borrowers have meanwhile grown more demanding. BIS research published in 2026 found that BDCs had lent approximately US$115bn to software companies, accounting for around one-fifth of their total lending and more than 80 percent of their rapidly expanding technology portfolios.

Among private-credit technology borrowers, the share of companies reporting negative earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) almost doubled, from 23 percent before 2020 to 46 percent afterwards. Median debt relative to EBITDA tripled among profitable borrowers. Lenders also moved higher in the capital structure, with first-lien loans increasing from 77.6 percent to 92.2 percent of those examined.

First-lien status gives a lender priority over junior creditors when recovering money from a failed business. The value of that protection still depends on the assets available to repay creditors and the amount of borrowing secured against them. A software company with weak earnings and a heavy debt burden can exhaust much of its enterprise value before lenders recover their principal, even when the loans occupy a senior position.

The BIS also found that spreads between stronger and weaker borrowers had narrowed as private-credit lending expanded. Investors were receiving less additional compensation for lending to companies with weaker financial profiles, despite the growing differences in their ability to service debt.

Private-credit managers have accumulated large pools of committed capital, while banks have returned more aggressively to parts of leveraged finance. Both compete to finance companies that want to avoid or supplement public debt markets. Borrowers with several financing options can negotiate lower spreads or more accommodating terms, and fund managers face pressure to deploy the money investors have committed.

What Fund Valuations Are Beginning to Reveal

The losses appearing in listed BDC accounts offer an indication of how individual lenders are responding. Reuters reported unrealised losses equivalent to 16.8 percent of net asset value at Investcorp Credit Management BDC during the first quarter of 2026, compared with 6.7 percent at FS KKR Capital and 6.5 percent at Blue Owl Technology Finance.

Portfolio composition, lending standards and valuation practices vary considerably between these firms. Nor do unrealised losses necessarily become permanent: a borrower’s recovery can support a subsequent increase in the loan’s valuation. Nevertheless, the figures demonstrate that reported performance can diverge considerably between lenders operating within the same broad asset class.

In April 2026, the BIS warned that private markets, which had reached approximately US$18tn in assets under management by 2025, had yet to experience a broad macroeconomic shock at their present size and complexity under higher interest rates. Its concerns extended beyond private-credit valuations to weaker underwriting practices and multiple layers of leverage across borrowers, investment funds and financial sponsors.

Loans originated when financing was readily available are now approaching refinancing or repayment dates under less accommodating conditions. Companies that cannot secure new borrowing at acceptable rates must negotiate with their existing lenders, reduce debt through business cash flow or seek additional equity from their owners.

Direct lenders have more scope than many public-market creditors to work with borrowers on revised financing arrangements. They can extend maturities, relax payment terms, provide additional capital or negotiate a restructuring without requiring agreement from a large group of bondholders. Such flexibility can preserve the value of a viable business that has encountered temporary difficulties. It can also keep a weak borrower operating for longer while interest continues to accumulate and the lender postpones recognising a loss.

Managers differ in how they approach these decisions, and BIS research has found considerably wider variation in private-credit fund returns than among comparable listed closed-end funds. Historical internal rates of return offer limited insight into what happens when borrowers miss earnings forecasts, seek amendments or require additional financing.

The loan-level record provides a fuller account. Family offices examining a manager can look at the proportion of interest collected in cash, the number of loans converted to PIK, maturity extensions, changes to covenants and the share of the portfolio placed on non-accrual. Valuation histories can also reveal how quickly a fund adjusts its estimates when individual borrowers encounter financial difficulties.

Repeated injections of fresh capital warrant examination alongside those figures. Additional financing may help a business complete an investment programme or recover from a temporary shortage of cash, but investors need to understand whether the new money is supporting improved operations or simply postponing repayment of existing debt.

A manager’s experience across earlier credit cycles provides further evidence, although many private-credit firms built much of their record during years when companies could refinance at relatively low cost. Recent performance figures now give investors an opportunity to examine how those lending practices withstand higher borrowing costs.

The Family Balance Sheet

The structure of a private-credit investment also determines how easily an investor can respond when circumstances change. Traditional closed-end funds generally run for approximately five to eight years, allowing managers to hold loans through much of their contractual life without facing continuous redemption requests.

Pension funds and insurers can accommodate long investment periods when their obligations permit. Family offices often have commitments extending across several asset classes, sometimes with less predictable payment dates. Private-equity capital calls, property refinancing, tax liabilities and distributions to family members can all require cash before a private-credit fund returns its capital.

A fund’s reported valuation offers little assurance about the price an investor could obtain from an early sale. Private loans trade infrequently, and finding a buyer for an interest in a closed-end vehicle may require accepting a discount. The yield investors receive must compensate them for that restricted access to capital as well as for the credit risk of the underlying borrowers.

Wealth managers have expanded access through vehicles offering periodic redemption opportunities, although the assets within them remain largely unchanged. Managers may hold additional liquidity, arrange borrowing facilities or limit withdrawals when redemption requests exceed available resources. Investors consequently need to examine the terms of the vehicle itself, including notice periods, redemption limits and the circumstances in which withdrawals can be suspended.

These arrangements have different implications for families that can leave capital invested for several years and those expecting to meet near-term liabilities from their portfolios. A private-credit allocation that appears comfortably covered by reported net asset value may be unavailable when a family needs cash elsewhere.

Senior secured loans still offer contractual protections, floating-rate income and access to financing transactions unavailable through conventional bond portfolios. Whether those characteristics justify the allocation depends on the manager’s underwriting, the cash generated by borrowers and the family’s capacity to hold the investment through periods of financial stress.

The next rounds of refinancing and repayment will provide a fuller picture of how much accrued income lenders ultimately collect. The quarterly disclosures already show which portfolios have begun recognising losses, where interest is accumulating instead of being paid and how differently managers are responding to borrowers under pressure.

VISTA DE ROTHARIA

Private-credit due diligence needs to examine the cash collected from borrowers, the terms being renegotiated and the liquidity available to the family.

Cash versus PIK income
Review the share of interest paid in cash and the proportion added to outstanding loans, particularly where borrowers originally agreed to make cash payments.

Loan valuations
Examine how managers value comparable credits, whether they use independent assessments and when they recognise a deterioration in borrower finances.

First-lien exposure
Assess repayment priority together with borrower earnings, debt levels and the assets available to creditors.

Amendments and non-accruals
Track maturity extensions, revised covenants, additional lending and loans on which managers have stopped recognising interest income.

Liquidez
Compare fund lock-ups, redemption restrictions and expected distributions with future capital calls, property financing, tax liabilities and family withdrawals.